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Abstract 
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from the principal to the agents) internalises the externality by making agents "residual 
claimants". Consequently, the second best situation can be improved upon just by changing 
the contracting structure of the principal-agents relationship.  The analysis is relevant to the 
literature on decentralisation, outsourcing, subcontracting and intra-firm organization. 
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Probably one of the most important issues regarding every orga-
nization is how to structure its operation. The solution to this
question encompasses so many factors that a thorough answer is
almost impossible. In the present paper we focus on just one as-
pect of it, namely, the contracting structure.
Certainly the allocation of contracting rights is important both
in the public sector (e.g. decentralization of public services) and
private sectors, within and between rms (e.g. team production,
producing within the rm or outsourcing, franchising). Our goal
is to highlight how the contracting structure a¤ects the e¢ ciency
of the organizations.
Our model consists of a principal who hires a group of agents
in order to jointly produce an output in a situation where this
output is the only contractible variable. The combination of these
two elements generates the essential ingredient in our analysis: a
positive externality between agents.
Since output is jointly produced and wages are contingent on
it, the e¤ort of any agent increases not only her own wage but also
every other agents wages. However, each players decision takes
into account only her private benets (wage) and costs (risk plus
disutility of e¤ort), and these are, due to the positive externality,
strictly lower than the social benets. As a consequence, each
agent exerts too little e¤ort compared to the e¢ cient situation.
The model departs from Holmstroms team production model
(Holmstrom (1982)) due to our assumption that output is not
deterministic, given the e¤ort exerted by each member of the
team. Hence the principal cannot o¤er a budget-breaking con-
tract to achieve rst best. Instead, the principal faces the classi-
cal trade-o¤ between incentives and insurance. When the risk is
low, the principal is able to provide close-to-rst-best incentives
to the agents (i.e., incentives such that private benets are close
to the social ones) but as the riskiness of the project increases, the
principal can no longer provide such incentives to the agents (it
is too costly) and hence the misalignment of incentives becomes
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larger. Consequently, whatever way the principal has to internal-
ize such externality, it becomes relatively more e¢ cient the riskier
the project is.
Given this situation, we nd that a decentralized or hierarchic
structure (as opposed to a centralized one where the principal
retains for herself the contracting rights and contracts directly with
each agent) mitigates the ine¢ ciency generated by the randomness
of the project by internalizing the positive externality each agent
has on the team. This happens because the agent who is assigned
contracting rights becomes residual claimant (whatever is not paid
to her subordinates accrues to herself) and thus she realizes the
positive externality that her e¤ort has on them. That is, higher
e¤ort increases the expected output and provides extra insurance
for her employees. This way she internalizes the e¤ect of her e¤ort
choice on the other agentsparticipation constraints: more of her
own e¤ort not only increases her own wage, but also the other
agentswages.
1.2 Related Literature
Without trying to provide an exhaustive review of the extensive
literature on team production and asymmetric information, we
survey the most directly related works and we refer to the bibli-
ographies therein for further information.
A large branch of the literature on hierarchies - for example
Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1995), among others -
concentrates on the e¤ects of hidden information (i.e. adverse
selection). Their driving force is that agents are heterogeneous,
have di¤erent productivities or marginal costs, and the principal
needs to design contracts taking into account that agents will use
their private information for their own benet. The issue of decen-
tralization of the contracting structure is mostly irrelevant in that
context given the revelation principle. Hence the attention focuses
on how to assign the di¤erent tasks according to the information
that agents are willing to provide (e.g. Prendergast (1995)) and
on analysing the e¤ects of monitoring (e.g. Baliga and Sjolstrom
(1998), Faure-Grimaud et al (2003)) or project choice (Choe and
Park (2003)).
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The seminal reference on moral hazard in teams is Holmstrom
(1982). As we said above, our analysis departs from it because
of the assumption that the technology is stochastic instead of
deterministic. Most related to our work is Itoh (1991), though
in his model di¤erent agents produce di¤erent non-deterministic
outputs and the issue is whether the principal is better o¤ by pro-
viding incentives for them to cooperate.1 Note that the fact that
in our setting output is jointly produced precludes "relative per-
formance" incentive schemes, the implementation of tournaments
(as in Lazear and Rosen (1981)) or collusion among agents.
The closest references to our study are those of Macho-Stadler
and Perez-Castrillo (1998) and Jelovac and Macho-Stadler (2002).
Their analyses consist of comparing di¤erent contracting struc-
tures in a binary e¤ort model but their study is based on the
di¤erent timing of events rather than the e¤ect of the externality
between agents. Moreover their results diverge from ours. They
nd that the hierarchic structure does not always perform better
than the centralized one. A detailed comparison of our results to
theirs is provided in Section 4.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: In Section 2 we
present the model and we solve it under the di¤erent contracting
structures: centralized and decentralized. In Section 3 we com-
pare both structures and discuss the higher performance of the
hierarchic one. Section 4 considers the robustness of the results to
alternative specications and explores some extensions. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The model presented below is based on Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1987).
1Alternatively, Itoh (1994) assumes joint production but considers whether
it is best for the principal to delegate the tasks partially or completely. In
the latter case he also compares the cases where tasks are undertaken by
the same individual or by di¤erent ones. Hence, he studies the e¤ect of the
allocation of tasks in the presence of externalities and di¤erent degrees of costs
substitutabilities rather than the contracting structure.
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A principal hires two identical agents (i = 1; 2) to undertake
the production of a joint output, x: Agents are assumed identical in
order to concentrate solely on the e¤ects of di¤erent contracting
structures. Output is assumed to be normally distributed with
mean  and variance 2 > 0. The expected output of the project
increases with the e¤ort exerted by the agents. For simplicity we
assume that expected output is simply the sum of both agents
e¤orts. (In Section 4 we discuss the consequences of relaxing this
assumption).
Given that e¤orts are non-veriable, contracts (wi (x) ; i = 1; 2)
can only be contingent on realized output. We constrain such
contracts to be linear in output.2
Contract o¤ers are assumed to be public, and so observable by
every party. We assume the principal can credibly commit to her
pledged policy, thus avoiding the issue of renegotiation.
The previous assumptions are summarized by:8>>>><>>>>:
 x  N (; 2)
  (e1; e2) = e1 + e2
 wi (x) = ai + bix; i = 1; 2
Hereafter, capital letters denote aggregate variables. Thus
E := e1 + e2, W (x) := w1 (x) + w2 (x), etc.
We assume the principal to be risk neutral, though her risk-
neutrality is not fundamental for the analysis. Hence she maxi-
mizes the expected prots,  (i.e. expected output minus total
wages). Agents are assumed to be risk averse with constant ab-
solute risk aversion (CARA) utility and index of risk aversion
r > 0. Later in the text we show that our results are robust to the
introduction of risk aversion heterogeneity. The disutility of e¤ort
 (ei) is assumed to be quadratic on ei 2 R+. Hence the utility of
2Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) provide a rationalization for this assump-
tion in contexts where the contract is repeatedly o¤ered over time. Note that
considering contracts to be linear in output is equivalent to the more realistic
assumption of considering them linear in prots.
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the principal and the agents are, respectively:8<:
 V (x) = x W (x)
 U (wi (x) ; ei) =  re r(wi(x)  12 e2i )
2.1 First Best
As a benchmark case we solve for the rst best solution where
e¤orts are contractible. The principals program reads as follows:
max
fw1(x);e1;w2(x);e2g
Ex fV (x)g
s.t.
8<:
 Ex fU (w1 (x) ; e1)g  U0
 Ex fU (w2 (x) ; e2)g  U0
That is, the principal maximizes the expected prot subject
to o¤ering at least the reservation utility to each agent (hereafter,
participation constraints are denoted PC1 and PC2 respectively).
Given the CARA utility functions and normally distributed
prots, we can transform the agents expected utility functions into
their certainty equivalent. E fU ()g ! E ()   r
2
V ar (). Hence
the expected utility of agent i is:
Ex fU (wi (x) ; ei)g ! ai + bi  E   
2
b2i  
1
2
e2i
where  := r2 > 0. The expression above has a very clear inter-
pretation. It is equal to the agents expected wage minus the costs
associated to the risk she is bearing and minus the cost of e¤ort.
Without loss of generality we assume that the reservation util-
ity after the certainty equivalence transformation is 0.
The rst best solution is:8<:
 e1 = e2 = 1
 wi (x) = 12 ; i = 1; 2
That is, the risk neutral principal absorbs all the risk and fully
insures the risk averse agents by o¤ering them a constant wage.
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Notice also that both agents are treated equally, their participation
constraints are binding and the expected prot of the principal at
the optimum ( = 1) is twice that of the single agent rst best
problem.
2.2 Centralized Second Best
A standard assumption in moral hazard settings is that the prin-
cipal is not able to directly contract on e¤ort. This is typically
assumed to be the consequence of a decient or too costly moni-
toring technology. Whichever the rationale, when we move from
the rst best setting where contracts can be contingent on e¤ort,
the principal faces the customary trade-o¤ between incentives and
insurance.
We rst consider the standard second best situation, where the
principal contracts directly with both agents. In the sequel we
call that situation the centralized second best. Then we analyse
the hierarchic second best situation, where the principal contracts
with one of the agents, and this agent subsequently contracts with
the remaining one.
Due to the non-contractibility of e¤ort, the principal can o¤er
contracts contingent only on output. Hence, she must design the
contracts in such a way that they provide the right incentives for
the agents to exert e¤ort. Technically, this implies adding to the
rst best program two new constraints, the incentive compatibility
constraints (denoted IC1 and IC2 hereafter).
The program of the principal reads now as follows:
max
fw1(x);e1;w2(x);e2g
Ex fV (x)g
s.t.
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
 Ex fU (w1 (x) ; e1)g  U0
 Ex fU (w2 (x) ; e2)g  U0
 e1 2 argmax
_e1
Ex fU (w1 (x) ; _e1)g
 e2 2 argmax
_e2
Ex fU (w2 (x) ; _e2)g
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The unique solution to the previous program is:8>>>><>>>>:
 e1 = e2 = 11+
 wi (x) = a + 11+  x; i = 1; 2
 a is such that the PCs are binding.
The trade-o¤ between incentives and insurance leads to a sub-
optimal e¤ort (ei < e

i ; i = 1; 2) and transfers some risk to the
agents (bi > b

i = 0; i = 1; 2), compared to the rst best case.
Consequently, the prots of the principal (and so total welfare)
are lower, too:  = 1
1+
< : As usual, the higher the parame-
ter  is (the higher the risk aversion of the agents or the higher the
variance of the project) the higher the ine¢ ciency of the second
best solution with respect to the rst best one.
The incentive power of the wage schedule is captured by the
slope of the contract. Note that the chosen e¤ort by each indi-
vidual depends only on the power of the incentive scheme of her
own contract (ei = bi). This is a particular feature of our model
(the robustness of our results when this condition is not met is
discussed in Section 4.2).
Once again, agents are treated symmetrically: the principal
o¤ers exactly the same contract to both of them. This seems in-
tuitive since agents are homogeneous and identical to each other.3
As we observed in the rst best case, the expected prots are
twice the single agent second best prots. Nevertheless, from the
agents point of view the xed payment of the contract is now
3The fact that agents are treated symmetrically reinforces the idea that
collusion through side contracting cannot occur. We could also imagine agents
colluding through forming a cartel and deciding jointly how much e¤ort to
exert. In this way, they will completely internalize the positive externality
and the only source of ine¢ ciency will be the standard moral hazard one.
Given that agents are risk averse and that costs are convex, the situation is
analogous to a single agent situation where the cost of total e¤ort E is 14E
2
and the total risk born by the agents is 4B
2.
Itoh (1993) provides a rigorous analysis of this situation allowing agents to
side contract on the observed e¤orts: the principal is always better o¤ because
she can now provide the same incentives at a lower risk level given that agents
are monitoring their partners e¤orts.
7
lower given that the expected output of the project is twice that
in the single agent case.
This highlights the essential element that is incorporated into
the problem when we move from the single-agent to the multi-
agent case: there is now a positive externality between the agents.
Since output is produced jointly and is the only contractible vari-
able, the wage of each agent is a function of the e¤orts of all the
agents involved in production, not only her own. When an agent
increases her e¤ort, she increases the expected wages of all the
agents.
However, the principal is unable to internalize this externality
when contracting in a centralized manner.
2.3 Hierarchic Second Best
Nevertheless we can improve upon the second-best solution simply
by modifying the contracting structure of the model. The main
intuition is that by transferring contracting rights to, say, agent
1 (hence establishing a hierarchy between the agents), she inter-
nalizes the positive externality her e¤ort has on agent 2. This is
so because she realizes that an increase in her own e¤ort does not
only increase her expected salary but also increases the salary of
her subordinate, thus relaxing PC2. We can clearly see that the
private benets of agent 1 have now increased with respect to the
ones she had under the centralized structure. Consequently, she
is willing to exert more e¤ort at no extra cost for the principal.
Ultimately, the principal extracts all this extra surplus from agent
1 and hence the change in the contracting structure results in a
higher expected surplus for the principal.4
Under the hierarchic structure, the principal contracts with
only one agent, who then subcontracts with the remaining one.
The timing of the game is as follows: the principal o¤ers a contract
W (x) = A + Bx to agent 1 and subsequently agent 1 o¤ers a
contract w2(x) = a2 + b2x (s.t. a2  A and b2  B) to agent 2;
then the agents decide their optimal e¤ort (IC) and, if their PCs
4Note that the hierarchic structure internalizes the positive externality
that agent 1 has on agent 2 (hence equating her private benets to her social
benets) but obviously does not a¤ect agent 2s private benets.
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are met, they exert e¤ort. Finally, output is realized and payments
are made.
Notice that there is a subtle change in the game played by
the agents when we move from the centralized to the hierarchic
case. In the centralized case it is implicitly assumed that agents
decide their levels of e¤ort independently and simultaneously (i.e.
they play a Cournot-type of game). However, in the hierarchic
structure agent 1 acts as a Stackelberg leader and agent 2 as a
follower (i.e. players are no longer playing mutual best responses).
In other words, agent 2 acts knowing what the optimal choice of
e¤ort of the other agent is.
Under our particular modelling assumptions this does not play
any role, given that the optimal choice of e¤ort depends only on
the slope of the contract and not on the e¤ort chosen by the other
player. In Section 4 we show under which circumstances our results
remain true.
We solve the program of the principal by backwards induction.
Hence, we rst analyse the program of agent 1 once she is o¤ered
the contract W (x) = A+Bx subject to the optimal behaviour of
agent 2 (i.e. PC2 and IC2):
max
fe1;w2(x);e2g
Ex fU (W (x)  w2 (x) ; e1)g
s.t.
8><>:
 Ex fU (w2 (x) ; e2)g  U0
 e2 2 argmax
_e2
Ex fU (w2 (x) ; _e2)g
Its unique solution is:8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
 eh1 = B
 eh2 = 1+1+2B
 wh2 (x) = ah + 1+1+2B  x
 ah is such that PC2 is binding.
As we observed in the second best case, each agent chooses her
own optimal level of e¤ort such that it is equal to the incentive
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power of her contract (e1 = B and e2 = b2). However, in this case
agent 1 exerts a strictly higher e¤ort than agent 2 (B > 1+
1+2
B).
Note that at a rst glance this does not seem optimal from the
principals perspective: given the convex disutility of e¤ort the
optimal allocation should, a priori, involve both agents exerting
exactly the same level of e¤ort.
The derivative of the Lagrangian of the previous program with
respect to e1 shows clearly how agent 1 internalizes the positive ex-
ternality she exerts on agent 2 through its participation constraint.
The Lagrangian of the previous program is:
L = (A  a2) + (B   b2)  E   
2
(B   b2)2   1
2
e21+
+ 

a2 + b2  E   
2
b22  
1
2
e22

+  (e2   b2)
and its derivative with respect to e1 should be equal to zero at the
optimum:
@L
@e1
= (B   b2)  e1 +   b2 = 0
The above condition di¤ers from the IC1 under the centralized
structure due to the fact that it includes the term (  b2). That
term captures precisely the positive externality that agent 1 has
on player 2.
Given agent 1s optimal behaviour we can move one stage back-
wards and consider the principals problem. Her program reads as
follows:
max
fw1(x);e1;w2(x);e2g
Ex fV (x)g
s.t.
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
 Ex fU (w1 (x) ; e1)g  U0
 e1 = B
 e2 = b2 = 1+1+2B
 a = ah (B)
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where the last three conditions come directly from agent 1s pro-
gram, thus ensuring that the solution is a subgame perfect equi-
librium.
Its unique solution is:8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
 eh1 = 2+3(1+)(2+)
 eh2 = 3+2(+2)(2+1)
 W h (x) = Ah + 2+3
(1+)(2+)
 x
 wh2 (x) = ah + 3+2(+2)(2+1)  x
 ah is such that PC2 is binding
 Ah is such that PC1 is binding
The prots of the principal (and so total welfare) are now:
h =
1
2
(2 + 3)2
(1 + 2) (2 + 3 + 2)
< 
Before we discuss the di¤erences between the hierarchic and
centralized structures in the following section it is worth pointing
out that the principal cannot do better than the hierarchic alloca-
tion through centralized contracting precisely because, as long as
the principal is the only one that contracts with the agents, both
agents fail to internalize the externality.5
3 Results
Two comparisons are relevant between the centralized and hier-
archic structures. First, from the point of view of the principal,
which one yields higher prots? And second, from the point of
view of the agents, how do the allocations of e¤ort and risk change
when we move from one contracting structure to the other?
5The fact that the principal cannot do better through centralized contract-
ing shows, in particular, that she cannot do better by contracting sequentially
either (once again, the agents fail to internalize the externality).
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Proposition 1 The hierarchic structure always yields a higher ex-
pected prot to the principal than the centralized one. The relative
gains are higher the higher the risk of the project and/or the index
of risk aversion of the agents.
1
0.5
0 g
hP
**P
Figure 1: Expected prots
The proof is immediate from comparing:
 =
1
1 + 
and
h =
1
2
(2 + 3)2
(1 + 2) (2 + 3 + 2)
and showing that
h=
is increasing on . Figure 1 shows both expected prots in terms
of .
Proposition 2 Under the hierarchic structure, agent 1 exerts more
e¤ort than agent 2. Moreover, both agents exert more e¤ort than
under the centralized structure, i.e. eh1 > e
h
2 > e

1 = e

2 8 > 0:
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Figure 2: E¤orts
The proof of eh2 > e

1 = e

2 is obtained from comparing
eh2 =
3 + 2
( + 2) (2 + 1)
and e1 = e

2 =
1
1+
: The result that eh1 > e
h
2 ; meanwhile, is
immediate from the fact that
bh =
1 + 
1 + 2
Bh
(and eh2 = b
h; eh1 = B
h).
Also from agent 1s program we nd that:
@bh2
@Bh
=
1 + 
1 + 2
2

1
2
; 1

This derivative shows that whenever the principal induces a
higher e¤ort on agent 1 (remember that eh1 = B
h); this one also
provides more incentives to agent 2 (since eh2 = b
h): From the prin-
cipals perspective this generates a more than interesting trickle
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down e¤ect that multiplies the initial rst-order e¤ect of an in-
crease in Bh by increasing also bh2 . However, this second-order
e¤ect is always lower than one and decreases with . That is,
whenever we increase  agent 1 is less willing to induce higher in-
centives on agent 2 (it becomes more costly). Figure 2 shows the
e¤orts of both agents under both contracting structures as func-
tions of the parameter : In particular, we can see that the risk
borne by the agents under the hierarchic structure tends to zero
as  !1; which is consistent with the derivative above.
It is also easy to see that a direct consequence of Proposition
2 is that the expected output under the hierarchic structure is
greater than under the centralized one.
Notice that the slopes of the wage contracts, besides providing
information on the optimally invested e¤orts, indicate also the risk
borne by the agents. Given the certainty equivalent, the risk borne
by agent i is equal to r
2
V ar(wi (x)) =

2
b2i . Thus, agent 2s risk
is 
2
 
bh2
2
; and agent 1s is 
2
 
Bh   bh2
2
. Note that agent 1s risk
depends on her net wage (W (x)  w2 (x) = A  a2 + (B   b2)x).
However, her invested e¤ort depends on the gross wage given that
she internalizes her positive externality on agent 2.
Proposition 3 Under the hierarchic structure, agent 1 bears less
risk than agent 2. Moreover, the latter bears more risk under the
hierarchic structure than under the centralized one.
Formally, the proposition can be re-written as follows:8<:
 bH > BH   bH ;8  0
 bH > b;8 > 0
and is depicted in Figure 3.6
6A question that becomes relevant once we allow for heterogeneous agents
on the level of risk aversion is whether the principal should contract with
the most or the least risk averse agent under the hierarchic structure. Given
Proposition 3 the answer is immediate: the least risk averse should end up at
the bottom given that the agent at the top is assuming the lower level of risk.
It is easy to prove that in this case the principal is still better o¤ under the
hierarchic structure than under the centralised one.
14
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Figure 3: Risks
Linking this result to the derivative above, we can see that
agent 1 is able to transfer part of her risk to agent 2. This transfer
is almost complete when  ' 0 (agents are almost risk neutral)
and decreases as  increases since it becomes more and more costly
to insure a more and more risk averse agent 2.
At rst sight, the fact that the agent higher in the hierarchy
bears less risk than her subordinates may seem puzzling. However,
when risk is interpreted not only as the variability of pecuniary
payments, it is indeed the case that outsourcing, subcontracting or
decentralization are ways to pass some risk to those at the lower
levels of the hierarchy. That is precisely one of the main criti-
cisms of subcontracting in the construction industry, outsourcing
in manufacturing or the privatization of public services. Namely,
they generate precarious and deregulated working conditions.
Proposition 3 highlights the fact that the hierarchic structure
cannot be replicated by a centralized one. It shows that although
agent 1 is exerting more e¤ort than agent 2 (Proposition 2), she
is bearing less risk. This seems to be at odds with the basic moral
hazard intuition that more incentives (higher e¤ort) are associ-
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ated with more risk. Once again, the reason is that the hierarchic
structure provides extra incentives to agent 1 through the internal-
ization of the positive externality she has on the remaining agent.
What are the mechanisms that make hierarchies more e¢ cient
than centralized structures?
Imagine, for illustrative purposes, that the principal o¤ers to
agent 1, under the hierarchic structure, the optimal centralized
aggregate wage contract (A = 2  a and B = 2  b). Agent 1s
optimal e¤ort is e1 = B and she can o¤er agent 2 the centralized
second best contract. In that case agent 2 invests the same ef-
fort as in the centralized case but now PC2 is not binding given
that agent 1 is exerting twice the e¤ort of that in the centralized
case. Hence, agent 1 optimally adjusts the contract o¤ered to
agent 2 until PC2 is binding (i.e. increasing agent 2s incentives
and decreasing her own risk), thus relaxing her own participation
constraint. Ultimately, the principal extracts all the extra surplus
obtained by agent 1 by making PC1 binding again. Hence we see
that agent 1 exerts an e¤ort higher than e1 since she internal-
izes the positive externality she has on agent 2. As a result of
that, we also observe a second order e¤ect on agent 2s e¤ort (the
derivative): given that her participation constraint is not binding
any more, she is o¤ered a slightly modied contract where more
incentives and less insurance are provided.
At the hierarchic optimum the principal does even better and
o¤ers a di¤erent contract from the aggregate centralized one.
4 Discussion
In spite of the convexity of the disutility of e¤ort and the risk aver-
sion of agents the hierarchic structure distributes asymmetrically
the risk and the e¤ort among the agents. But, regardless of the
ine¢ ciency inherent in that, the internalization of the externality
makes the principal better o¤ overall.
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4.1 The role of hierarchy
The hierarchic structure introduces extra incentive constraints in
the principals program given that the o¤ered contract to the sec-
ond agent needs now to be optimal from agent 1s perspective.
This negative aspect is outweighed by the fact that agent 1 now in-
ternalizes the positive externality she has on the remaining agent.
All gains come from handing over contracting rights to agent 1,
thus making her the residual claimant of agent 2s activities. More-
over, agent 1s incentives with respect to agent 2 are very much
aligned with the principals ones given that any increase in the
formers utility function is appropriated by the latter. From an
egalitarian point of view the hierarchic situation may be seen as
worse than the centralized one, given that identical agents are
treated di¤erently and the allocation of e¤ort and risk between
agents is asymmetric.7
The obvious question, given the results presented above, is why
we do not see hierarchies everywhere since they seem to outper-
form centralized structures. First of all, for the results to hold
true, we need the two basic assumptions for the existence of the
positive externality, that is, team production and output being the
only contractible variable. Then, there is a long list of elements
that we deliberately ignored so that we could isolate the contract-
ing structure e¤ects from aspects such as the presence of di¤er-
ent tasks, monitoring, heterogeneity of agents, complementarity
or substitutability of e¤orts, etc. Our point is precisely that, even
in the presence of any of those elements, the contracting structure
still matters.
Without departing from our model we think that it is worth
analysing how a limited liability constraint (wi (x)  0;8x) may af-
fect the comparison between the agents under the hierarchic struc-
ture. In order to capture the intuition of what could happen if we
introduced such a constraint under the hierarchic and centralized
structures we can check which is the maximum value of x for which
the contract o¤ered to the agents is negative (i.e. the point where
7The non egalitarian outcome, given identical agents, leads us to view
the introduction of behavioural assumptions as an interesting line for future
research on the topic of hierarchies.
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Figure 4: Limited liability
the limited liability constraint bites). In Figure 4 we have depicted
these thresholds in terms of the parameter . Note that the curve
that corresponds to the hierarchic net contract of the rst agent is
always lower than the two remaining curves. That is, the limited
liability constraint of agent 1 under the hierarchic structure bites
at a lower value of realized output than the one of agent 2. This
indicates that agent 1 is able to ensure that she gets a negative
payment less often than agent 2 (that is consistent with Proposi-
tion 3 - agent 1 bears less risk - and with the fact that the principal
is able to induce a high level of e¤ort on agent 1 at a low level of
risk). When comparing the centralized and hierarchic structures,
we can see that for low levels of  the hierarchic structure is more
a¤ected by the limited liability constraint (in particular, agent 2s
realization of wages is negative for a larger range of output realiza-
tions). However, for large values of , limited liability constrains
the centralized structure more.8
8The heuristical argument that limited liability constraints bite less under
the hierarchic structure for high levels of ; together with the fact that the
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Obviously the analysis is a partial one and the problem of
how the principal optimally adjusts the o¤ered contracts in the
presence of limited liability constraints is left for future research.
Another simplifying assumption that may have strong e¤ects in
a real world application of our model is the existence of contracting
costs. The fact that the hierarchic structure requires the writing
of as many di¤erent contracts as levels existing in the hierarchy
may decrease the benets in overall welfare for the principal and
a¤ects the number of hierarchies we observe in the real world.
Finally, there is also a case for allowing agents to communi-
cate with the principal and hence act as monitoring devices of the
other agents activities. This is the focus of Baliga and Sjolstrom
(1998), Faure-Grimaud et al (2003), and is beyond the scope of
our analysis.
4.2 Robustness To Di¤erent Specications
The main objective at this point is to show which modelling as-
sumptions are essential for our results to hold true. As a result
of assuming constant risk aversion utilities, normally distributed
prots and linear contracts, we managed to nd a closed form so-
lution. There are two main consequences that are essential for our
results.
First, the incentive constraints of each agent depend only on
her own wage and are independent of the e¤ort invested by the
remaining agents (i.e. there are no strategic complementarities or
substitutabilities).9 Consequently, an agent a¤ects the other agent
only by increasing her expected utility or, in other words, only by
relaxing her participation constraint. That is precisely the driving
force of all our analysis.
Second, under the hierarchic structure the rst agent is not
relative gains of the hierarchic structure are strictly increasing in  (tending
to outperform 125% better than the centralised structure as  tends to 1),
should lead us to observe more hierarchic structures in situations where agents
are very risk averse or where the randomness of the project is greater.
9Strategic complementarities or substitutabilities can arise, for instance,
from dropping the condition that the expected output is the sum of the exerted
e¤orts.
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only internalizing the externality but is also modifying the wage
o¤ered to her subordinate with respect to the second best situa-
tion. Nevertheless, her optimal choice of e¤ort does not depend on
the distribution of the wages and depends only on the total wages,
given that she internalizes completely her externality on agent 2
through her participation constraint.
When we consider a more general setting the analysis becomes
ambiguous precisely because the previous two observations no longer
hold. That implies that when we analyse the rst agent program
under the hierarchic structure other e¤ects may outweigh the pos-
itive e¤ects of internalizing the externality. Suppose rst that the
new setting is still such that there are no strategic complemen-
tarities or substitutabilities. In that case, agent 1 may switch
the contracting structure in such a way that she induces a dif-
ferent risk structure on agent 2 with respect to the one that the
principal would o¤er under a centralized structure. This would
not matter if the internalization of the externality made agent 1s
optimal e¤ort only contingent on the total wages (W (x)) but in
general that is not true. One could imagine a situation where the
incentives of agent 1 on setting agent 2s contract may make the
overall e¤ect of the hierarchic structure worse for the principal.
The presence of strategic complementarities seems to reinforce
the pre-eminence of the hierarchic structure over the centralized
one. But strategic substitutabilities work against the incentives of
agent 1 to invest more e¤ort under the hierarchic structure and
hence may outweigh in some cases the positive e¤ects that result
from internalizing the externality.
Lastly, the root of the benets of the hierarchic structure over
the centralized one is that agent 1 internalizes the externality. For
that to be the case we need to assume that agent 1 is able to have
a rst mover advantage. Otherwise, she would choose her e¤ort
according to her own net wage regardless of the positive externality
she has on agent 2 (technically, she does not choose her own e¤ort
subject to the participation constraint of agent 2 and thus she
does not internalize the positive e¤ect that her own e¤ort has on
the participation constraint of agent 2; the key is that agent 1 can
take advantage of the interaction of her two choice-variables (e1
and w2(x)). We believe that this is the most natural situation: the
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leader of a team or the individual who occupies a place at the top
of the hierarchy not only proposes a contract to the subordinates
but, at the same time, also announces her plans for the future (her
e¤ort decision). It would be boundedly rational for her not to take
into account the strategic e¤ects of both her decisions.
Precisely, Macho-Stadler et al (1998 and 2002) dene a hierar-
chic structure where agent 1 decides her own e¤ort after o¤ering
the contract to agent 2. Hence, agent 1 does not take into account
the essential e¤ect of our analysis (i.e. the positive externality
agent 1 has on relaxing the participation constraint of agent 2).
But instead the authors contemplate the two elements we avoided
in our analysis. Their goal is to determine whether the strategic
complementarity between e¤orts is larger than the negative e¤ect
of introducing an extra incentive constraint on the wage o¤ered
to agent 2. In a binary outcome scenario with a Cobb-Douglas
e¤ort production function they nd that the centralized structure
does better whenever the productivity parameters of both agents
are small enough (i.e. whenever the strategic complementarity is
unimportant).
5 Conclusion
We have presented a case where the allocation of contracting rights
plays a crucial role in an organizations e¢ ciency.
Whenever a principal needs to hire a group of agents to pro-
duce a joint output and is only able to write contracts conditional
on this output, a positive externality arises between the agents.
We have shown that a hierarchic structure, unlike the centralized
one, can partially internalize this externality since, by reallocating
contracting rights, it makes the agents at the top of the hierarchy
"residual claimants" of the workers below them. This way, the
agents at the top realize the e¤ect that their e¤ort choices have
on their subordinatesparticipation constraints, thus internalizing
the externality. This allows the principal to induce higher incen-
tives to the agents at the top of the hierarchy without increasing
insurance costs. The overall e¤ect is an increase in the expected
prots. Moreover, agents higher in the hierarchy exert more e¤ort
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and bear less risk than those in lower tiers.
The crucial factor that explains the pre-eminence of a decen-
tralized structure over the centralized one is that the rst one
gives agents more decisive power (contracting rights). This results
in the internalization of the externality by agent 1 and, due to the
alignment of the latters and the principals incentives, in higher
prots for the principal. No structure where the principal retains
all contracting rights can, therefore, outperform (or even match
the performance of) the hierarchic one: the externality would not
be internalised. Moreover, these results hold in spite of assuming
homogeneous agents.
Summing up, the above analysis means that hierarchic struc-
tures should not only matter for supervising and e¢ ciently allo-
cating tasks but may introduce gains simply because of the change
in the contracting structure. Its relevance seems to arise in several
distinct building blocks of economic life, and so the present analy-
sis can be easily applied to issues such as decentralization within
the government, privatization of public services, hierarchies and
delegation within the rm, subcontracting, outsourcing, franchis-
ing and sharecropping, among others.
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